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Thaksin’s Clamp on Media:
Emulating Singapore?
n a region where independent critical
media are either not tolerated or
remain underdeveloped, Thailand has been a
notable exception in Southeast Asia. That
makes recent attacks on international and
domestic media by Thai Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra and local authorities all
the more significant. Furthermore, they have
been accompanied by public expressions of
admiration by Thaksin for the political system
and control of opposition within Singapore.
This has raised concerns that attacks on the
media are symptomatic of a wider political
worldview by Thaksin that could jeopardise
democratic consolidation in Thailand.
Emulating the slick authoritarianism
practiced in the city-state would be an
especially tall order for Thaksin. The political
pluralism and civil society space already
established in Thailand would not only have
to be extinguished, but replaced by new
organisations facilitating political co-option.
But he would not be the first Asian leader to
find inspiration, and indeed instruction, in
the Singapore model of how to tame the
media. In particular, Lee Kuan Yew’s
demonstration of the vulnerability of media
organisations to pressure on the bottom line
has been noted by numerous authoritarian
governments, and part of Thaksin’s strategy
to quell critical media draws on this lesson.
The incident that attracted most attention
was the threatened expulsion of two Far
Eastern Economic Review journalists, Shawn
Crispin and Rodney Tasker, in response to
a short article of about 150 words in the
10 January issue dealing with relations
between Thaksin and King Bhumibol
Adulyadej. The journalists, and the Review’s
Hong-Kong based editor, Michael Vatikiotis,
were labeled national security threats and
placed on a list of 46 ‘dangerous’ foreigners
by Thai immigration police.
Thaksin condemned the article as showing
disrespect for the monarchy. However, the
real ‘crime’ was drawing attention to the
King’s critical observations about business
links between Thaksin and the King’s son,
Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn. Already, in
the course of his birthday speech, the King
had referred to what he regarded as Thaksin’s
double standards and egoism. Highlighting a
rift between Thaksin and the popular
monarch is unlikely to have been appreciated
by the Prime Minister. The Review and
another Dow Jones-owned publication, the
Asian Wall Street Journal, had produced
various articles in recent times drawing
connections between Thaksin’s political
maneuvers and his extensive business
interests. By now Thaksin may have felt a
strong message needed to be sent.
A subsequent article in The Economist that
referred to potential troubles for the Royal
family and potential political impacts also
led to the halting of distribution of that issue.
Given that a similar expose published some
time back by the Review encountered no
problems then, Thaksin’s ascent to power
appears to have made a difference to how
authorities respond to such pieces.
Meanwhile, other pressures have been applied
to journalists and media organisations of late.
Thailand’s Anti-Money Laundering Office,
normally deployed to investigate drug
traffickers and fraudsters, has been delving
into the bank accounts and financial affairs of
many senior journalists or their relatives, as
well as non-government organisational activists
and opposition party leaders. When uncovered
in March, this exercise brought howls of protest
from the Thai Journalists’ Association that
also sought a court order to halt what it viewed
as a blatantly political probe.
In the same month, military-owned radio
stations dropped the use of news programmes
provided by the Nation Multimedia Group
following broadcasts of an interview with critics
of Thaksin’s government. The daily newspaper,
The Nation, which belongs to the same group,
has been a consistent critic of what it has
described as shallow populism, nepotism and
cronyist tendencies under Thaksin.
In other developments, advertising by both
the government and Thaksin’s own
companies has been withdrawn from
newspapers critical of Thaksin. Major
publications affected by this include
Thailand’s daily newspapers The Bangkok
Post, The Nation and Matichon. Thaksin’s
companies initiated this process during the
campaign for the January 2001 general
election. In one case, where this proved
unviable, Thaksin simply purchased
Independent Television (ITV) and sacked
critical journalists.
It is in the withholding of advertising revenue,
and in the blocking of distribution, that
Thaksin’s attempts to combat media criticism
most resonate with the effective methods
adopted in Singapore. During the 1960s and
early 1970s, the termination of journalists’
visas, arrest under the Internal Security Act
and the dissolution of entire newspapers
were means for quelling critical media in the
city-state. But since the late 1980s the
emphasis shifted to commercial pressures.
One aspect of this has been the use of the
legal system to inflict hefty fines through
defamation, libel and contempt of court cases.
The other aspect is restricting the level of
circulation, rather than outright banning of
publications, which undermines the attraction
of publications to advertisers. This
commercial discipline has fostered
widespread self-censorship among media
organisations wishing to retain access to
Singapore’s markets.
Authorities and politically connected business
tycoons in Malaysia had already taken keen
note of these techniques before Thaksin’s
recent initiatives. In the last few years there
has been a spate of massive legal suits taken
out against media organisations and opinion
piece writers. The Home Affairs Ministry
has also delayed nearly every major current
affairs magazine at some time or other in
response to critical reporting. When approval
finally comes through, the editions affected
are often more than a month out of date. This
technique has been exercised in recent months
against numerous editions of the Far Eastern
Economic Review, Newsweek and Time.
Although all of this has resonance with
Singapore, it is clear that these larger, more
diverse political systems will not be able to
simply replicate a Singapore model of control.
Replicating the same degree of discipline of
media control as in Singapore would require
the development of a mutually reinforcing
set of institutions comprehensively
subordinated to ruling party interests. There
are no cracks in the Singapore system. This
brand of foolproof state corporatism is
unmatched in the region. While Thaksin
admires the Singapore political model,
significant opposition and civil society groups
will oppose its implementation in Thailand.
Nevertheless, the Singapore model will
continue to inspire Thaksin and other proto-
authoritarian leaders. It will offer guidance
on how to move some way towards an
authoritarian ideal that the city-state’s leaders
seem to have come closest to.
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